Halvorson (2012) argues through a series of examples and a general result due to Myers (1997) 
Introduction
Halvorson (2012) argues that the "semantic view" of theories, (Suppes, 1967; van Fraassen, 1980) , has, and can have, no account of theoretical equivalence-indeed, it "fails miserably"to be amenable to any such account.
He considers three model theoretic criteria for theoretical equivalenceidentity, equicardinality of model classes, and 1-1 onto mapping of models of one class to isomorphic models of the other class. He produces counterexamples to each of them, and claims the three possibilities exhaust the plausible alternatives. I have no brief for the semantic view, but whatever its faults, Halvorson's objections on this score need not be among them. The reasons reveal aspects of the semantic view that some of its advocates appear to have contradicted or at least chosen not to display, and suggest that, despite the rhetoric of its advocates, in important respects a tenable version of the semantic view is not much different from the "syntactic" view that, whatever more it may be, a theory is something that is said in a language.
Halvorson also criticizes van Fraassen's claims that for philosophical purposes model theory has more explanatory resources than logical syntax, but I shall not be concerned with those comments. Halvorson's broader point is that the rhetoric of the semantic view regrettably eschews the full resources of logic and mathematics that are needed to understand the properties of theories, and I agree, but I will not elaborate. My argument is entirely with his claim 3 that no plausible account of the structural equivalence of theories is available to the semantic view that defeats his criticisms. Such an account has been available for almost half a century.
Syntax and the Semantic View of Theories
Halvorson's strategy is to examine three model theoretic mappings that might correspond to interdefinability relations of syntactical objects--sentences or formulae--and finding that all three succumb to his counterexamples, infers that no account of theoretical equivalence is possible on the semantic view of theories. I will dispute Halvorson's contention that his counterexamples refute all possible accounts of theoretical equivalence compatible with the semantic view, but, first, two lacunae in his argument need to be addressed, gaps that might be thought to invalidate his argument (and mine) without the necessity of considering the details of his examples or offering an alternative to his three possible criteria for theoretical equivalence. I think one of the gaps can be filled, and the other is sufficiently vague that it is worth considering Halvorson's arguments without trying fully to fill the hole. Patrick Suppes (1967) , for example, says that a theory is a set theoretic predicate, and a predicate is something linguistic. Van Fraassenseems to take exception: "The impact of Suppes' innovation is lost if models are defined, as in many standard logic texts, to be partially linguistic entities, each yoked to a particular syntax. In my terminology here the models are mathematical structures, called models of a given theory only by virtue of belonging to the class defined to be the models of the theory" (1989, 366) .Other writers (e.g., Lloyd, 1984) , perhaps influenced by van Fraassen, suggest that model classes are directly given with the use of a language.What they, and van Fraassen,unlike Suppes, say cannot be taken entirely seriouslybecause it yields a conception of theories that makes them ineffable and their characterization magical. Newton, Einstein, Schrodinger, etc., had no way of specifying the class of relational structures they intended except indirectly as those structures satisfying their theoretical claims. Nor do we today. The "yoke" to language may be neglected, but it remains.
To be at all plausible, the semantic view must distinguish between the content 5 of a theory-its class of models-and the means of characterizing that classthe theory expressed in some language. That specification is only possible if predicates in the language denote specific relations in each model for the theory-otherwise the very notion of a theory-even construed as a complex predicate-specifying the class of models it is true of or satisfied by makes no sense. Advocates of the semantic viewimplicitly agree ingiving examples implying that the models constituting the content of a theory are described by open formulae or equations, oftenwith the qualifying conditions of the usual formulations of the theory removed. Thus Lloyd (1984) describes population genetics models by various sets of equations, and van Fraassen describes theories as given by dynamic laws among variables ranging in value over some "state space," so that, for example, the models of Newtonian gravitational theory are described as the solutions to the dynamical equations The space of models of, say, Newtonian theory cannot be directly indicated by pointing, or looking in a magic closet, or through a magical looking class. Van Fraassen may be slippery, but he is not silly. Like it or not, on the semantic view language and logical syntax are indispensable tools for the presentation of theoretical content, and that being so, there is no reason why proposed 6 syntactical equivalence relations corresponding to model theoretic equivalence relations should not be considered, and no reason why the fact that relations in different models are co-denoted by the same expression in a language should not be taken into account. It is a familiar point that one and the same theory can be specified in different languages, and we expect some interdefinabilityrelations between the sentences of the theory in two or more A tenable semantic view, as I construe it, also requires that there is a model theoretic relation that establishes a common content to different presentations of a theory in different languages. Invariance over alternative linguistic presentations is of course not the same as having no suppositions about relations between structures and languages; it is not the same as being entirely a-lingual. It is a weaker requirement, but one that I will argue can be met. Ideally, equivalences characterized by interdefinability of languages and theories would perfectly correspond with the appropriate model theoretic equivalences, and I will argue that that, too, can be satisfied.
A second objection to Halvorson's argument is that he does not consider observational constraints. At least on van Fraassen's version of the semantic view, an equivalence relation among theories ought to preserve observational 7 equivalence: the equivalent theories should make the same observational claims. Two theories might be equivalent by the kinds of structural relations among models that Halvorson considers, or others, but nonetheless be inequivalent because they make different observational claims, or because the observational fragments of their models are distinct. According to van Fraassen (2006) , what counts as observational adequacy of a theory for a body of data is that a "data model" can be "embedded" in a model of the theory. I am not sure what a "data model" is, for example whether it is a collection of instances of relations or values of a function, or whether it is a general relation-e.g., a collection of records of the positions of a planet versus an orbit for the planet. No matter: to take but one of Halvorson's criteria for equivalence, isomorphism, if two models are isomorphic then any relational structure (i.e., any "data model") than can be isomorphically embedded in one can be isomorphicallyembedded in the other. It would seem therefore than some purely formal model theoretic equivalence relation shouldbe necessary and sufficient for observational equivalence on the semantic view of theories. Even if some further invariance were required-for example, if substructures of all modelswere somehow designated as "observational," (although that, too, could only be specified in a language) and relations among model classes sufficient for theoretical equivalence had also to map "observational substructures" to isomorphic "observational substructures"--a formal equivalence relation of some kind between model classes would be at least necessary for theoretical equivalence.
Isomorphisms and Objections
Halvorson offers three possible criteria of equivalence, identity of model sets, equicardinality of model sets, and 1-1 correspondence of isomorphic models, of which only the last is minimally plausible: two sets of models are equivalent if and only if there is a bijection taking models to isomorphic models. Without defining "isomorphism," Halvorson gives two examples to show that his isomorphism criterion makes inequivalent theories equivalent, an example to show that it leaves equivalent theories inequivalent, and a general argument.
Other examples show that identity and equicardinality proposals would make obviously inequivalent theories equivalent. Since these latter criteria arepatently in disagreement with the criteria for theoretical equivalence I will describe,I will ignore them and the examples addressed to them.
Halvorson's first isomorphism example reveals a fundamental ambiguity in the notion of "isomorphism."That argument is as follows: "Let L(T) be the language with a countable infinity of 1-place predicate symbols P1; P2; P3;…and let T have a single axiom =1x(x = x) [there is exactly one thing]. Let L(T0) be the language with a countable infinity of 1-place predicate symbols Q0;Q1;Q2…, and let T0 have axioms =1x(x = x) as well as Q0x -> Qi x for each i in N.
"…every model of T is isomorphic to a model of T0 and vice versa. Indeed, a model of T has a domain with one object that has a countable infinity of monadic properties, and model of T0 also has a domain with one object that has a countable infinity of monadic properties. Therefore, T and T0 are 9 equivalent according to [the isomorphism] criterion... And yet, T and T0 are intuitively inequivalent. We might reason as follows: the first theory tells us nothing about the relations between the predicates; but the second theory stipulates a non-trivial relation between one of the predicates and the rest of them. Again, our intuition is backed up by the syntactic account of equivalence: the theories T and T0 are not definitionally equivalent...."
Halvorson does not define what he means by "isomorphism," and that turns out to be crucial. In footnote 5 of his paper he claims that there is no notion of isomorphism between models of different theories, which seems flatly to contradict the argument he gives above. Since I cannot make his text consistent, I will defend the argument rather than the footnote and offer an interpretation of "isomorphism" that makes sense of the quoted text. I take it from the example that his idea is something like this: M1 = <D1; Q0…>, M2 = < D2; P0…>, where the Qs and Ps are relations of any orders, are isomorphic if and only if there is a 1-1 map f from D1 onto D2 and a 1 -1 map g from the Q's onto the P's taking each n-order relation to an n-order relation, and for all nth order Q and all d1..dn in D1, (f(d1),...,f(dn))g(Q)if and only (d1…, dn)Q., and (to be redundant) inversely. Halvorson might have had in mind a relation that is in some respects more general than this, for example allowing appropriate expansions by new relations of models in various model classes. I cannot tell from his text. But in any case the notion of isomorphism Halvorson uses in the example is purely structural-any nth order relation can be mapped to any other nth order relation.Thus, in his example, if M1 is a relational structure for the P language of his example in which all P properties hold except P0, and M2 is a structure in which all P properties hold except P1, Halverson would count (indeed have to count) as an isomorphism the map that interchanges P0 to P1 and leaves all other P properties unchanged. That P0 is the interpretation of the predicate P0 and P1 the interpretation of the predicate P1 is ignored by the isomorphism. The relations become merely placeholders. That is a natural enough notion of isomorphism but it is not the standard notion of model theory, and, I claim, since Halvorson is considering mappings for relational structures for definite languages, it is the standard notion that is appropriate for the semantic view and the one that the semantic view must adopt if it is to allow a theory to be presented at all. "What does the semantic view say about the relation between the theoriesB and S?...an arbitrary set S cannot be equipped withoperations that make it a Boolean algebra; for example, there is no Booleanalgebra whose underlying set has cardinality 3. Thus, there are structuresin the class S that are not isomorphic to any structure in the classB…I claim, however, that the "theory of sets" is equivalent to the "theoryof complete atomic Boolean algebras." Indeed, to each set S, we canassociate a CABA, namely, its power set F(S) with the operations of union,intersection, and complement. Furthermore, the set G(F(S)) of atoms ofF(S) is naturally isomorphic (as a set) to S. In the opposite direction, toeach CABA B we can assign a set, namely, the set G(B) of its atoms, andit follows that B is isomorphic (as a Boolean algebra) to F (G(B) ).
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Tosummarize, there is a pair of mappings F :S ->B and G : B ->S that areinverse to each other, up to isomorphism."
It is difficult to know what to make of this argument because it changes the game.By Stone's famous theorem, a set theoretic object-a field of sets--can be defined from a Boolean algebra, but onlyusing set theoretic operations that are not Boolean operations, and for atomic algebras that object will be (or be isomorphic to) an object-a power set-that can be defined in a model of set theory as Halvorson says. In the example, he has not expanded the Boolean algebras by using only Boolean relations-he has used set theoretic relations in addition. In a model of set theory he has considered a set theoretic object and considered only isomorphism between that object and anobject constructed via set theory-the power set of the set of atoms--from the Proof. Let T be the empty theory formulated in a language with a single binary predicate R. Let T' be the empty theory formulated in a language with a single ternary predicate S. Myers (1997) proves that there is a definitional equivalence consisting of maps F : T -> T' andG: T' ->T.
"Now we prove that there is no definitional equivalence F :T -> T' such that for all models n of T, T', Card(n) = Card(F*(n)) for all models n of T'.
For this, we only need the simple fact that definitional equivalences are conservative with respect to isomorphisms between models; that is, ifF*(n) = F*(n') then n = n'. Now let A be the set of isomorphismclasses of models mof T' such that Card(n) = 2. Let B be the set ofisomorphism classes of models m of T such that Card(m) = 2. ClearlyB is a finite set that is larger than A. By Myersuses a notion of interdefinability, "isomorphic interpretability," that is distinct fromhaving a common definitional extension or coalescent model sets, but includes these as a special case, and, as Halvorson argues, is also distinct from H-isomorphic bijections of the model classes.The empty theory of the binary relation and the empty theory of the ternary relation are interpretively isomorphic in that every binary structure can be paired with a ternary structure (for simplicity, on the same domain), and conversely in such a way that the collection of such structures is the elementary class of an axiomatizable theory and such that every (M) isomorphism of the binary reductof a model in the class determines an isomorphism of the ternary reduct and conversely. There are maps from the binary language to the ternary language, and conversely, but as noted they do not determine a common definitional extension. Interpretive isomorphism guarantees that many important properties of theories are shared, but Myers remarks that some meta-mathematical properties one might think necessary for equivalence are not preserved by interpretive isomorphism, for example: having a one-element model;being logically equivalent to a theory whose axioms are equations; having a universal axiomatization (every substructure of a model of the theory is a model of the theory); and closure with respect to unions of chains of models. (I do not know of proofs that all of these properties are shared by theories with a common definitional extension, but I conjecture they are.)
Halvorson asserts that theoretical equivalence is a collective, or global property of the set of models of the theories, and that seems correct. Both coalescence and interpretive isomorphism are global in the sense that they require a quantification over all models of each theory and more than the existence of a 1-1 map taking models to H-isomorphs. Interpretive isomorphism offers an account of theoretical equivalence that the semantic view of theories could conceivably adopt: given that the semantic view must allow syntactic structures as the means of presentation of scientific theories, I
suppose it can allow the existence of syntactic structures (e. g., the axiomatizability required for interpretive isomorphism) as part of the means of defining or establishing theoretical equivalence. But then again, perhaps those advocates should have misgivings both because, as Myers proves, the empty theory of the binary relation is interpretively isomorphic to the empty theory of any n-ary relation, n greater than 2, and because, if, as I have suggested, the syntax of their model descriptions is in terms of equations, interpretive isomorphism does not preserve the property that a theory can be expressed in equational form.
Conclusion
Halvorson's fundamental viewpoint is that the restrictionson mathematical analysis that advocates of the semantic view wish to impose would deny to investigators the full resources of logic and mathematics that are needed to understand the properties of theories, and I agree. For example, the differences betweencommon definitional extensions and interpretive isomorphisms seems worth exploring , and there may be other interesting, alternative candidates for formal theoretical equivalence. Halvorson concludes with a hopeful reference to recent work in category theory for the promise of a deeper account of theoretical equivalence and perhaps other relations of methodological interest. I cannot, and would not, refute a hope, and I leave its development to him with good wishes but with this caveat: on the one hand, his arguments thus far do not show that a tenable version of the semantic view of theories has no available account of theoretical equivalence; 20 on the other hand, the accountof theoretical equivalence that best fits the semantic view provides no grounds for insisting on a purely model theoretic conception of scientific theories utterly free of the fetters of language--a view untenable on its face the moment one considers how the space of models of a theory can possibly be indicated. And I think the second hand is the conclusion that should be drawn from Halvorson's discussion of theoretical equivalence.
